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Recent Decisions

prevent the dissemination of adverse and prejudicial publicity; and will
further insulate the judicial process.
Groppi lacked sound constitutional foundation. The Court, through
its misapplication of precedent, and its unconvincing analysis of the
traditional alternative remedies other than the change of venue, showed
that it had failed to go to the core of the community prejudice problem.
The risk of community prejudice in misdemeanor cases is slight. When
community prejudice does occur, as it allegedly did in Groppi, the
change of venue possesses no inherent superiority over other procedures
in correcting the harm that may be done to the right to an impartial
trial. When press coverage has been so intense, and of such scope as to
imperil the fairness of a misdemeanor trial, moving the trial to another
county is unlikely to result in a less prejudiced jury 3 Changing the
venue will only serve to bring the same publicity problems to the new
courtroom, where the defendant must rely on the same traditional
procedures that the Court found insufficient.
Norman K. Clark

CIVIL RIGHTS-HOUSING LAW-EFFECTS OF RACIAL CONCENTRATION IN

RENEWAL AREA-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that the Department of Housing and Urban Development's approval of an urban renewal plan, by concentrating on land
use factors without inquiry into the effects of the type of housing on
racial concentration, does not comply with the Housing Act of 1949
and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.

Shannon v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
Plaintiffs were white and Negro residents, businessmen and representatives of private civic organizations in the East Poplar Urban Renewal
Area of Philadelphia. They brought this action against the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) seeking an injunction
after the trial, including the following: prior criminal record of the accused, existence or
contents of confessions, performance of examinations or accused's refusal to submit to
them, identity and testimony of potential witnesses, possibility of a plea of guilty to the
offense charges or to a lesser offense, and any opinion as to accused's guilt or innocence
or the merits or evidence of the case. Id.
33.

Case Comment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 180, 183-184 (1966).
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against the issuance of a contract of insurance or guaranty, and against
the execution or performance of a contract for rent supplement payment for Fairmount Manor. Fairmount Manor is a section 221(d)(3)1
apartment project which was to be constructed in the East Poplar
Urban Renewal Area. The original urban renewal plan contemplated
redevelopment of Fairmount Manor primarily for single-family owneroccupied homes. HUD, however, approved a change in the plan to one
which contemplated section 221(d)(3) dwellings with rent supplement 2
assistance by following what it called the "red line" procedure. 3
Plaintiffs contended that the location of a section 221(d)(3) project
with rent supplements on the site chosen would have had the effect of
increasing the already high concentration of low income Negro residents in the East Poplar Urban Renewal Area. Plaintiffs further contended that HUD, in reviewing and approving this type of project on
the site chosen, had no procedures for considering, and did not consider, its effect on racial concentration in that neighborhood and the
City of Philadelphia as a whole.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and held that HUD
did not abuse its discretion in deciding that a change to a section 221(d)
(3) rent supplement housing project was not a material change in the
urban renewal plan, and in approving the change under a "red line"
procedure without requiring a public hearing. 4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,5 however, held that the procedures which HUD followed did not comply with the Housing Act of
1. Housing Act of 1954 § 221(d)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (Supp. V, 1969). This
type of housing project is designed to assist private industry in providing housing for
low and moderate income families, and provides that HUD may insure mortgages on
housing owned by eligible sponsors for the entire replacement cost of the project.
2. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (Supp. V,
1969).
3. Shannon v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 815 (3d
Cir. 1970). The "red line" procedure was promulgated by a memorandum from the HUD
Assistant Regional Administrator dated December 29, 1966. This memorandum sets forth
an informal procedure for approving minor changes in an urban renewal plan, and
establishes standards to be used to determine whether a proposed change will require a
public hearing. The memorandum provides:
Since all red pencil changes are changes to the renewal plan, they must be reviewed
by the Planning Branch. Here is where the Regional Office determines:
(1) Whether the change constitutes a material alteration in a basic element of the
Plan; and
(2) Whether or not the change is acceptable to us from a planning viewpoint.
4. Shannon v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 305 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.
Pa. 1969).
5. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
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19496 and the applicable sections of the Civil Rights Acts of 19647 and
1968.8
Under section 101(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, 9 the local public
agency must submit to the Secretary of HUD a "workable program for
community improvement"'1 before HUD can enter into any contract
for federal financial aid or guarantee any mortgage." A public hearing
must be held before any land is acquired by the local public agency. 12
HUD has no regulations specifying the time or manner for conducting
a public hearing, but it recognizes that a change in an urban renewal
plan may require a new public hearing.'3 HUD further requires that
the local public agency submit a Report on Minority Group Considerations 14 to show compliance with the requirement of a "workable program for community improvement." Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted housing, and
directs the Secretary of HUD to prevent discrimination in housing.' 5
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 directs the Secretary to promote fair housing throughout the United States.' 6
In defending its exercise of this responsibility, HUD contended that
land use controls were the determinative factors, and since the proposed change to a section 221(d)(3) project with rent supplements was
not a basic change in land uses, it could be made under the "red line"
procedure. Plaintiffs' contention was that many factors other than land
use must be considered in determining whether an urban renewal plan
is part of a "workable program for community improvement." They
argued that the original plan with resident home ownership would
create a racially balanced environment. They further argued that a
change to a section 221(d)(3) rent supplement housing project would
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (1964).
7. Title VI, §§ 601-605, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964).
8. Title VIII, §§ 801-819, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V, 1969).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964).
10. 436 F.2d at 813 citing 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964).
11. Id.
12. Housing Act of 1949 § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964). The court noted that the
purpose of this section is to give the public an opportunity to discuss, scrutinize, and
participate in the local public agency's urban renewal plan before the agency enters into
a contract for federal financial aid. 436 F.2d at 813.
13. 436 F.2d at 813 citing the Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7206.1. ch. 3 (1968).
This Handbook is published by HUD for internal departmental use.
14. Id.
15. §§ 601, 602, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1 (1964).
16. §§ 801, 808e, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608(d)(5) (Supp. V, 1969).
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cause racial concentration since other low income housing projects
were already located in the neighborhood.
The court of appeals rejected HUD's contention, stating that exclusive concentration on land use factors without any determination of
the social factors involved in the type of housing selected was prohibited since 1964. Thus, the court recognized the true dimensions-social
and economic-of the national housing problem, and set aside HUD's
administrative decision for failing to consider the relevant social factors.
The problem of racial concentration, the court reasoned, was the
relevant social factor to be considered by HUD. The court stated that
discrimination could result from "undue concentration of persons of
a given race, or socio-economic group, in a given neighborhood.
Increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to
lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the na17
tional housing policy."
No federal courts have dealt with the problem of the effects of racial
concentration in housing as discrimination. The Arizona Court of
Appeals, however, held that the racial character of the neighborhood
surrounding the proposed project cannot be ignored in choosing a low
income housing site.' Two federal courts have recognized that public
housing site location is relevant to the issue of discrimination, but those
cases involved an intention by state agencies to perpetuate racial
concentration. 19 The court in Shannon noted that the lack of evidence
showing discriminatory site selection was irrelevant and considered the
effects of racial concentration as discrimination.
Discrimination in housing encompasses a wide range of conduct,
both governmental and private. Judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by state 20 and federal 2 ' courts has been prohibited.
A municipal housing commission's refusal to admit Negroes to a lowcost housing project has been found discriminatory.2 2 A city's refusal
to grant rezoning essential to the construction of a low-income housing
project has been held to be discrimination.2 Private racial discrimina17. 436 F.2d at 820-821.
18. El Cortez Heights Residents and Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Auth.,
10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969).
19. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Hicks
v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
20. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
22. Jones v. City of Hamtrack, 121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
23. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969). See also Ranjel v.
City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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tion in the sale or rental of any property has been struck down.2 4 In
addition, a number of discriminatory practices in the sale, rental,
financing and brokerage services of housing are prohibited by Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.25
The decision in Shannon expands the scope of the policy against
discrimination in housing by recognizing that mere racial concentration can in effect be discriminatory. This appears to be a logical extension in view of the duty imposed on HUD to take affirmative action to
eliminate discrimination in federally assisted housing.2 6 It is impossible
for HUD to carry out this affirmative duty if it does not consider the
effects of racial concentration.
As a result of this case, procedurally, HUD must utilize institutionalized methods2 7 in determining site selection and type of housing
selection. Substantively, these methods must provide the information
necessary for HUD to consider the effects of site selection or type of
28
housing selection on racial concentration.
In addition, HUD cannot emphasize the economic considerationsthat is, to build the most for the least amount of money-rather than
the social considerations. In the future, economic reasons should not
dictate the selection of a housing site or type of housing project to be
constructed. HUD will have to develop criteria2 for making a proper
determination in the selection of type and location of future housing
projects to de-isolate racial and minority groups.
As a practical matter, it is doubtful whether any criteria developed
by HUD will work. It should not be difficult for HUD to utilize institutionalized methods for determining site selection or type of housing
selection. 30 These methods can readily provide the information necessary for a determination by HUD of the effects of site selection and type
of housing selection on racial concentration. But once HUD determines such effects, it will apply a balancing test and weigh the needs of
additional minority housing at the site selected against the disadvan31
tages of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration.
24. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
25. §§ 804-806, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (Supp. V, 1969).
26. See 436 F.2d at 816.
27. 436 F.2d at 821. The court of appeals found two institutionalized methods which
may be acceptable: (1) public hearing (see note 12, supra), and (2) Report on Minority
Group Considerations. 436 F.2d at 821.
28. Id.
29. See 436 F.2d at 821-22 where the court suggests some considerations relevant to a
proper determination by HUD.
30. See note 27, supra.
31. See 436 F.2d at 822.
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It is not unreasonable to expect that the need for additional minority
housing at the site in question will almost always outweigh the disadvantages of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration. The
determination of the need for additional minority housing at a particular site remains with HUD. As long as HUD adopts institutionalized
methods by which it can consider, and does consider the effects of a
proposed housing project on racial concentration in the area chosen,
it is not likely its administrative decision will be set aside.3 2 No realistic
alternative site for the project may exist. It is only logical that housing
projects for low income families be located in those urban areas where
there is an immediate necessity to tear down slums. 3 3 Since a large

number of these urban areas are non-white, and with the trend continuing that way,3 4 it is inevitable that these projects will tend to per-

petuate racial concentration of non-whites. 35 Also, strong community
opposition prevents the location of low income housing in suburban
36
residential areas.

The decision in Shannon represents a judicial attempt to deal with
the social and economic problems of the urban renewal areas and cities
as a whole. The decision is not surprising considering the expanding
role of the courts in the remedying of social problems, particularly
those involving alleged racial discrimination. 37 The judicial attempt in
Shannon, however, cannot be expected to effectively cope with the
social and economic complexities of the national housing problem.
Mere consideration by HUD of the effects of type or site location of
future housing projects on existing racial patterns alone will not
remedy the housing problem. It is submitted that positive measures
are needed to prevent housing patterns from remaining segregated.
One possible solution for eliminating racial concentration, and for
achieving "well-planned, integrated residential neighborhoods, ' 38 is
the implementation of racial quotas. The successful use of racial quotas
has been demonstrated.3 9 The problem with their use is that they
require classification by race, which the Constitution usually forbids.
32. Id. at 819 where the court noted that administrative decisions which do not consider the relevant factors will be set aside.
33. Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 524
34. See SCIENTIFIC AM.

(1967).
July 1971, at 17.

35. See note 33, supra.
36. See Fisher, Low Cost Housing Systems, 2
37.

URBAN

LAW.

146, 163 (1970).

1970 Wis. L. REV. 559, 567.

38. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
39. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 31, 37 (1960).
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Classification has been allowed for the purpose of. achieving-equality,
and required to the extent necessary to avoid unequal treatment by
race; 40 therefore, classification should not present an insurmountable
problem.
Authority for the use of racial quotas is found in the analogous area
of school desegregation. The United States Supreme Court recently
sanctioned the use of racial quotas to eliminate racial discrimination in
public schools in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.41 In Swann, the Court approved the establishment of faculty
ratios based on race 42 and the use of a mathematical ratio of students
based on race. 43 The Court's objective in Swann was to eliminate all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation from public schools.4 4 Segregation
in public schools was the evil attacked by Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka.45 Although the Supreme Court stated in Swann that the
important objective of Brown would not be served if school desegregation cases were used to accomplish purposes outside their scope, the
Court indicated that "desegregation of schools ultimately will have
impact on other kinds of discrimination. ' '46
It is submitted that racial discrimination in housing is one type of
discrimination where the school desegregation cases can have great
impact. The underlying policy for desegregation of schools applies
equally to desegregation of housing. It is hoped that the use of racial
quotas to eliminate racial discrimination in schools will be adopted as
a remedial measure in the analogous area of racial discrimination in
housing.
Thomas A. Koza
40. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir.
1968). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
McDaniel, Superintendent of Schools v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); North Carolina State
Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
41. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
42. Id. at 18-20.
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id.:at 15.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. 402 U.S. at 22-23.
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